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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue1
On July 8th, 1982, several assassins in the village on al Dujayl, Iraq tried to take
Saddam Hussein’s life during his visit there. After his escape, but during the same day,
Saddam’s forces entered the village and began the process of seizing about 1,500
residents ,2 taking them away for detention, torture, killing, or some combination of those
three.3 Several of the villagers spared by the forces belonged to the Baath Party,
including current IHT defendants Abdullah Ruwayid and Ali Daih Ali.4 A few days
after the July 8th assassination attempt, those Baath Party members wrote letters to the
Baath regime informing on villagers with familial connections to a Shiite opposition
group called the Dawa Party.5 The letters both identified those families as disloyal to

1

The Prosecutor has framed the issue thus: “Several of the defendants in the al Dujayl case are local
residents of the town. They are alleged to have pointed out fellow residents from Dujayl who were disloyal
to the regime. The residents whom these defendants identified were taken to various interrogation centers
and tortured, killed, or detained for many years without charge. When these detained individuals returned
to Dujayl, they found their homes were destroyed and orchards leveled. Does the decision of the
informants to collaborate with the former Iraqi regime and identify people subject them to liability before
the IHT?” [hereinafter “Message from the Prosecutor”].

2

John F. Burns, Trial Plan for Saddam Accelerated; Government Drops U.S. Strategy Proposal, THE INT’L
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 7, 2005, at 7 [hereinafter “HERALD TRIBUNE”; reproduced in accompanying
Notebook 2 at Tab 3].
3

Grotian Moment Blog, Issue#34: Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal, Show Trial or Real Trial?: A
Digest of the Evidence Submitted During the Prosecution’s Case-in-Chief, (March 9th, 2006), at
http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/. [hereinafter “Issue#34”] [reproduced in accompanying
Notebook 2 at Tab 10].
4

3rd LD Saddam Hussein Trial Resumes with Hearing Defendants Individually, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS
SERVICE, March 12, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter “XINHUA”; reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 7].
5

Saddam Admits to Dujail Order, THE AUSTRALIAN, March 3, 2006, at 9 [hereinafter “THE AUSTRALIAN”;
reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 2].

1

Saddam’s regime and provided information as to their whereabouts.6 Using that
information, Saddam’s forces found those families, detained them without a proper
criminal procedure, and tortured some of them.7 Many of those victims returned later to
al Dujayl only to discover that their homes and crops had been destroyed.8 Do the
resident-defendants’ acts of identification and collaboration subject them to criminal
liability before the IHT?
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Civilians can be held liable for the most serious crimes in international
law.
The Iraqi High Tribunal Statute (“IHT Statute”) states that the IHT possesses
jurisdiction over “any Iraqi national,” a category that includes all of the informantdefendants in the al Dujayl case.9 Also, Article 15 of that Statute provides for individual
criminal liability in the case of any “person” who violates the crimes within the IHT’s
jurisdiction.10 The IHT Statute therefore provides an adequate basis for assigning
criminal liability to the al Dujayl informants.
Even in the absence of that statutory framework, though, international law has
long assigned criminal liability to civilians. The post-Nuremberg courts, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the International Criminal Tribunal for

6

See Issue#34 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 10].

7

See Message from the Prosecutor, supra note 1.

8

Id.

9

Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court (2005) [hereinafter “IHT Statute”] (emphasis added). Articles 1114 address, respectively, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and “Violations of Iraqi Laws”.
[reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 7].
10

Id. at art.15.

2

Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) all held civilians liable for violating the most serious international
criminal laws, or the “law of nations”. The al Dujayl informants therefore cannot invoke
their status as civilians to shield themselves from liability before the IHT.
2. The al Dujayl informants are liable for crimes against humanity.
The informants acted as aiders to the Saddam regime’s crime against humanity at
al Dujayl. To establish their liability as aiders, the Prosecution must first establish that
the crime against humanity itself occurred. The Prosecution will succeed in doing so
because the evidence already submitted satisfies the three elements listed for a crime
against humanity in Article 12 of the IHT Statute: (a) a widespread or systematic attack
(b) directed against a civilian population (c) with knowledge of the attack.11
Once the crime itself has been established to the court’s satisfaction, the
Prosecution will then prove that the informants acted as aiders to the crime. To do so, the
Prosecution need not identify the principal in the crime or prove that Saddam and his
current co-defendants acted as the principals.12 Also, since the mens rea requirement for
aiders and abettors is not as high as the corresponding requirement for principals,13 the
Prosecution should not encounter much difficulty in proving the informants to be aiders.
Since other war crimes tribunals have held informants to be liable for aiding and abetting
crimes against humanity, the IHT will likely follow suit.14

11

Id. at art.12.

12

See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (ICTR Chamber 1 Sept. 2, 1998), where
the court held the civilian defendant guilty of genocide and of crimes against humanity [reproduced in
accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 14].

13

Id. at para. 484.

14

See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (ICTY Trial Chamber May 7,
1997) at para.657 and para.687 [hereinafter Tadic; reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 18]
(citing Case 16, Vol. I Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes Fur Die Britische Zone in Strafsachen,

3

3. The informants are not liable for genocide, war crimes, or violations of
Iraqi law.
The IHT Prosecutor would encounter much more difficulty establishing the
civilian defendants’ liability for genocide, war crimes, and violations of Iraqi laws. The
IHT Statute assigns a high mens rea requirement for a genocide charge, an element of
intent that would be impossible to demonstrate in the case of the informants.15 The
informants also cannot be assigned liability for war crimes, as the events in al Dujayl do
not qualify as an “armed conflict.”16 Lastly, to pursue liability for violations of Iraqi law
would also lead to a dead end, as the IHT’s elements for crimes and the Iraqi Penal Code
itself would provide a successful defense for the informants against any of the charges
under that broad category.17
The Prosecutor therefore should focus strictly on the charge of crimes against
humanity, and only on the theory of aiding or abetting. The theory of a joint criminal
enterprise will not succeed as readily as the aiding/abetting one. The difficulty here
echoes the problem in obtaining a genocide conviction: the mens rea requirement for a
joint criminal enterprise is intent, while the requirement for aiding or abetting is simply

at 60 (1948) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 13]; Gustav Becker, Wilhelm Weber, and 18
Others, Vol. VII Law reports 67).
15

Iraqi Special Tribunal, Elements of Crimes, at 2, available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/
[hereinafter “Elements of Crimes”; reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 5].

16

IHT Statute, supra note 9, at art.13 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 7].

17

Elements of Crimes, supra note 17, at 7, 10 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 5].

4

knowledge.18 Despite these difficulties, the Prosecutor should find success in securing
liability for aiding crimes against humanity.
4. The informants’ likely defenses will not succeed.
The informants might invoke the defense of superior orders and of playing too
small a role to be liable. The first one, following superior orders, is available only to
soldiers, not to civilians.19 The second defense has proven futile in several war crimes
tribunals.
In summary, as all three elements of a crime against humanity are present in this
case, the Prosecution will be able to establish the informants’ role as aiders to that crime,
and the probable defenses will not likely prove effective. Given those three facts, the
Prosecution should feel confident in prosecuting the informants. The IHT will likely find
those defendants criminally liable.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In July 1982, armed gunmen attempted to assassinate Iraqi head of state Saddam
Hussein as he visited the town of al Dujayl. In response, Saddam and his regime spent
the next several years conducting a violent “investigation” of the incident, a process
resulting in the detention of about 700 residents of al Dujayl and the deaths of more than
150 of them.20 The first step in the campaign involved house raids by Saddam’s troops.
Uniformed soldiers beat residents, and agents in civilian attire entered homes to gather

18

Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment (ICTY Appeals Chamber February 25, 2004),
at para.102 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 19].

19

Elies van Sliedregt, Defenses in International Criminal Law, from the 17th Int’l Conference of the Int’l
Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, at 42 (Aug. 25 2003) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2
at Tab 5].
20

Issue#34, supra note 3 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 10].

5

intelligence.21 After military officers arrested the 700 townspeople, Saddam personally
interviewed some of them and discovered that only ten people had participated in the
assassination attempt.22
Out of the hundreds of civilians killed in the campaign, 148 received at least an
ostensible criminal procedure involving documented arrest and execution.23 Yet, no
evidence has come to light indicating that a trial preceded these executions.24 Many of
the detainees who survived their imprisonment nonetheless endured violent torture.25
The group of detainees included children under the age of thirteen.26 Some of the
underage detainees were killed without any judicial procedure , and state officers buried
their bodies in secret.27 In recent trial testimony, Saddam declared that he personally
ordered “the arrest, interrogation, trial, and execution of townspeople.”28 As part of the al
Dujayl campaign, Saddam’s forces also bombed and bulldozed the orchards on which the
townspeople depended for their sustenance.29

21

Id.

22

See Prosecution’s 0228 Exhibit 01 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 11].

23

Prosecution’s 0228 Exhibit 13 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 12].

24

Grotian Moment Blog, Issue#33: Michael A. Newton, What is the Significance of the Documents Entered
into Evidence by the Prosecution?, (March 7th, 2006), at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/.
[hereinafter “Issue#33”, reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 9].
25

See Issue#34, supra note 3 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 10].

26

Id.

27

Issue#33, supra note 24 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 9]; see also Prosecution’s 0228
Exhibit 16 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2, at Tab 13].
28

Grotian Moment Blog, Issue#32: Michael Scharf, What is the Significance of Saddam’s Admission?,
(March 6th, 2006), at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/. [hereinafter “Issue # 32”] [reproduced in
accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 8].
29

Issue#34, supra note 3 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 10].

6

The civilian defendants from al Dujayl played a central role in this campaign.
Three of those defendants wrote letters to the Baath Party’s central command, informing
on fellow villagers supposedly linked to a Shiite political party with a militia wing.30 The
letters led directly to the arrests of later victims of the campaign, as the Iraqi Intelligence
Service detained the families identified in those missives.31 Some of those victims were
“brought to show trials and executed” while others survived only to see their farms
destroyed by Saddam’s troops.32
III. CIVILIANS CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE MOST SERIOUS CRIMES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A. Civilians who violate the crimes listed in the IHT Statute subject
themselves to that tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Article 1, §2 of the IHT Statute states that the tribunal possesses jurisdiction over
“any Iraqi national” or resident accused of the crimes described in the Statute’s Articles
11-14, so long as the alleged crimes occurred between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003.33
Similarly, Article 14 assigns individual criminal liability to “[a] person who commits a
crime within the jurisdiction of this Court….”34 Such a person “shall be liable for
punishment in accordance with this Statute.”35 Therefore, the fact that the al Dujayl
informants are civilians does not protect them from liability for the four categories of

30

THE AUSTRALIAN, supra note 5, at 9 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 2].

31

HERALD TRIBUNE, supra note 2, at 7 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 3].

32

Id. (interior quotation marks omitted).

33

IHT Statute, supra note 9, at art.1, §2 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 7].

34

Id. at Art. 15, §1 (emphasis added).

35

Id.

7

crimes under the IHT Statute: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
violations of Iraqi laws. Liability for IHT crimes extends to all Iraqis.
B. The basis for civilian liability can be found in the modern development of
international law.
Even if the wording of the IHT Statute had been less clear, precedents from
international law establish that civilians can be held liable for the most extreme
international crimes. In 1961, the court in the trial of Adolph Eichmann quoted
approvingly from an international legal scholar who asserted that the “judicial power of
every state…extends…to the punishment…of offenses against the law of nations, by
whomsoever…committed.”36 In the spirit of that principle, the Genocide Convention
requires all states parties to the treaty to punish any genocide perpetrators, “whether they
are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals.”37 The
Torture Convention uses fewer words but conveys the same rule. Simply, any “national”
of a state party who commits torture will be liable for the act under the jurisdiction of that
state’s courts.38
More specifically, the other current international criminal tribunals have assigned
liability to civilians. The ICTY has held civilians liable for the same crimes listed in the
IHT Statute.39 Similarly, the ICTR has held civilians guilty of those crimes.40 In
36

Henry Wheaton, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (1916) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook
2 at Tab 6] (citing Attorney General v. Adolph Eichmann, Criminal Case No. 40/61, at para.15 (Dist. Ct. of
Jerusalem 1961) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 12]).

37

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, art. 4
[hereinafter “Genocide Convention”; reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 2].

38

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26,
1987, at. 5 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 1].

39

See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Kos, Radic, Zigic, & Prcac, Case No. IT-98-30-1T, Judgment (ICTY Trial
Chamber November 2, 2001), at para.4. [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 17]. The
defendant Zigic was a civilian taxi-driver ordered to deliver supplies to the Omarska camp.

8

assigning liability to civilians, both of those tribunals acted from statutory language
nearly identical to the text of the IHT’s Articles 1 and 15. The ICTY devotes Article 7 to
individual criminal responsibility (the topic of the IHT Statute’s Art. 15), assigning
liability to a “person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and
abetted” a crime under that Statute’s jurisdiction (emphasis added).41 The IHT Statute
employs the same word, “person,” to assign individual criminal responsibility.42 Just as
the Yugoslavia Tribunal has implicitly applied that word to encompass civilians, so too
will the Iraqi Tribunal likely consider civilians to fall within the category of the word
“person” in Article 15.
The statute for the Rwanda Tribunal uses the same word, “persons”, at four
different points. “Persons” are subject to that tribunal’s personal jurisdiction, and
“persons” can be held liable for genocide and crimes against humanity.43 Most
importantly, the ICTR possesses jurisdiction generally over “persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law….”44 By convicting civilians for

40

See Akayesu, supra note 12. [Reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 14]; see also Prosecutor
v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A (ICTR Appeals Chamber Oct. 19, 2000) (holding the civilian
defendant guilty for the same crimes) [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 16].

41

Statute of the Int’l Criminal Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended by U.N.S.C. Res. 1660, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., at art.
7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1660 (2005) [hereinafter “ICTY Statute”] [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at
Tab 10].
42

IHT Statute, supra note 9, at art. 15 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 7].

43

Statute of the Int’l Criminal Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring
Territories Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), amended by U.N.S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., at arts. 2, 3, and 5,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2005). [hereinafter “ICTR Statute”] [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at
Tab 11].

44

Id. at art. 1.

9

such violations, the ITCR, like the ICTY, has tacitly acknowledged that civilians qualify
as “persons” liable for international crimes of a serious nature. The theory that civilians
are liable under the same wording in the IHT Statute follows logically from the statutory
and case law history of those two other tribunals.
IV. THE AL DUJAYL INFORMANTS ARE LIABLE FOR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY.
A. The fact of the crime must first be established.
In order for the Al Dujayl informants to be held liable for crimes against humanity,
as aiders and abettors, the Prosecution must establish that a principal committed the
primary crime itself. Although the Prosecution does not have to establish that Saddam
and his officers were the principals, the occurrence of the principal crime must first be
established to the Tribunal’s satisfaction. The ICTR stated this rule in Akayesu thus: “an
accomplice may…be tried even where the principal perpetrator of the crime has not been
identified, or where, for any other reasons, guilt could not be proven.”45
The rulings of the other international tribunals, particularly when addressing such
topics as crimes against humanity, play a significant role in the determinations of the
Iraqi High Tribunal. Article 17 of the IHT Statute states that the decisions of other
international criminal courts may assist the IHT when it interprets the parts of the IHT
Statute dealing with the same crime and with genocide and war crimes (Articles 11-13 of
the IHT Statute).46 Therefore, given the Akayesu rule (that accomplices may be held
liable in the absence of the principal’s liability), the al Dujayl informants may be liable
for crimes against humanity even if Saddam and his current co-defendants are found

45

Akayesu, supra note 12, at para. 531 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 14].

46

IHT Statute, supra note 9, art. 17 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 7].

10

innocent of that crime. Nonetheless, for the informants to be liable, the Prosecution in
the al Dujayl case must establish that a crime against humanity did occur.
B. Elements of “crimes against humanity,” under the IHT Statute.
Just as in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, the IHT version
of a crime against humanity can take one of a variety of forms, including “willful
murder,” torture, forced disappearance of persons, and “imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of liberty” in violation of the norms of law.47 If the perpetrator of any of
those acts commits them (a) “as part of a widespread or systematic attack” (b) “directed
against any civilian population,” and (c) “with knowledge of the attack,” then, and only
then, will he be guilty of a crime against humanity under Article 12.48
1. A Widespread or Systematic Attack
a. A Disjunctive Element
The al Dujayl campaign constitutes a systematic attack against the people of that
town. Since the IHT Statute requires only that the attack be widespread or systematic,
the informants would not be able to claim that Saddam’s attack does not satisfy this
element. The ICTY’s decision in Tadic bolsters this view.49 The ICTY Statute’s section
on crimes against humanity makes no mention of the “widespread/systematic” element.50
Yet, that element had become a part of the ICTY’s jurisprudence by the time that court
47

IHT Statute, supra note 9, at art. 12 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 7].

48

Id. Those same three elements establish a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute. See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF, 183/9, art. 7 (1998) [hereinafter “Rome
Statute”] [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 8] (“For the purposes of this Statute, ‘crime
against humanity’ means [any of a long list of violent acts] committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack…”).
49

Tadic, supra note 14 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 18].

50

ICTY Statute, supra note 41, at art. 5 [reproduced in accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 10].
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heard the Tadic case.51 That case dealt primarily with the defendant’s activities at the
Omarska Camp, and he apparently did not participate in a widespread campaign against a
general population.52 Due to the narrow scope of his own involvement within the broader
Serbian onslaught against Croatians and Bosnian Muslims, Tadic argued before the ICTY
that his actions did not reflect a “widespread” attack.53 To support his argument, he
asserted that the “widespread/systematic” element required that the attack be widespread
and systematic.54 The ICTY Trial Chamber rejected this interpretation of the element,
holding that those words constitute two alternative requirements: the element requires
that the attack be widespread or systematic.55 Even in the absence of the Tadic holding,
though, the IHT statute explicitly separates the two words with an “or” and thus clarifies
the requirement for meeting that element. The Prosecution need only show that the
attack on al Dujayl was widespread or systematic.
The al Dujayl informants may argue that Saddam’s attack on their neighbors did
not satisfy the “widespread” part of the element, due to the limited geographical area of
the attack. The informant defendants may also argue that the hundreds of victims
constitute a small number relative to other groups victimized by crimes against humanity
in history. However, the informants will not be able to make such a compelling argument
on the “systematic” prong of the element. The Prosecution’s exhibits (entered into
evidence on February 28 and March 1, 2006) indicate a long and carefully executed
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attack on the townspeople of al Dujayl. Saddam and his forces did not stop their
campaign with the arrest and execution of hundreds of the town’s residents. The
campaign took another sinister turn when Saddam ordered the destruction of the town’s
orchards, in what he called a “modernization” program.56 The ICTY held in Tadic that,
as long as “a pattern or methodical plan is evident,” the attack is “systematic.”57 The
documented and premeditated steps of the al Dujayl campaign, from the arrests and the
“investigation,” to the “executions,” the secret burials ordered by the state, and the twopart decimation of the orchards, all establish the systematic nature of the attack. Since
the “widespread” and “systematic” prongs are disjunctive under Tadic and under the IHT
Statute, the attack on al Dujayl satisfies the first element for a crime against humanity in
Article 12.
b. A “Preconceived Plan”
The ICTR has taken a similar approach to the “systematic” part of that element.
In Akayesu, that tribunal held that:
The concept of “systematic” may be defined as thoroughly organised and
following a regular pattern, on the basis of a common policy involving substantial
public or private resources. There is no requirement that this policy must be
adopted formally as the policy of a state. There must however be some kind of
preconceived plan or policy.58
The “preconceived plan,” in the case of al Dujayl, can be found in the ample
documentary evidence already submitted by the prosecutor, including the many internal
state memos and reports on the handling of the matter.59 That evidence of a preconceived
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plan satisfies the element’s “systematic” prong. Therefore, the evidence already
submitted by the Prosecution establishes the first element of Article 12’s “crimes against
humanity.”
2. Directed Against Any Civilian Population
a. Discriminatory Intent
Saddam’s forces did direct the al Dujayl attacks at a civilian population. Article
12’s use of the adjective “any” before “civilian population” may seem to indicate that the
attacked population need not consist of a particular religious, ethnic, or political group for
this second element to be satisfied. However, the ICTY has interpreted the phrase “any
civilian population” to mean that the attack must be motivated by a discriminatory intent
on the part of the attacker.60
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute contains the same phrase as the one in the IHT
Statute’s Article 12: “any civilian population.”61 The ICTR Statute, on the other hand,
expressly requires that the attack occur on racial, religious, or ethnic grounds.62 Amnesty
International has criticized the ICTR for including this component within the “civilian
population” element.63 Nonetheless, France, the United States, and Russia have all issued
statements defining “civilian population” as one whose status in a particular demographic
group makes those civilians the target of the attack.64 In the most authoritative
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expression of this view, the U.N. Secretary General has also interpreted the ICTY’s
Article 5 as requiring a discriminatory intent on the part of the perpetrator.65 Bowing
under the pressure from the Secretary General, the ICTY ruled, despite the plain wording
of its own statute, that an attack on civilians must be discriminatory in order to be a crime
against humanity.66
The Prosecution in the al Dujayl informants’ case therefore needs to take one of
two approaches to this problem. The Prosecution needs either to establish that Saddam’s
forces attacked al Dujayl on discriminatory grounds or to argue that the IHT’s Article 12
should not be interpreted the way that the Secretary-General or the ICTY would. To
succeed with either tactic would be challenging but not impossible.
The informants might argue that Saddam’s intent in attacking the town was
retaliatory and not discriminatory. They will argue that, had the assassination attempt not
occurred, no attack would have ensued. To defeat this argument, the Prosecution will
have to show that the victims of the attack belonged to a particular ethnicity or religious
sect. Some media reports on the campaign indicate that Shiites were specifically targeted
in the forced detentions and crop destruction.67 Yet, since the town consisted mostly of
Shiites,68 the Prosecutor may face difficulty in establishing that Saddam’s regime targeted
Shiites as Shiites, and not as villagers collectively responsible for the assassination
attempt. The fact that some of those villagers belonged to a militia opposed to Saddam
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would only bolster the informant-defendants’ claim that the campaign against al Dujayl
was retaliatory and not discriminatory.69 The Prosecutor therefore may find the
discriminatory intent element an impossible one to satisfy. The evidence may simply not
support the Prosecutor’s position.
If the evidence does not support that position, the Prosecution will have to assert
that Tadic’s requirement of discriminatory intent does not apply to the IHT Statute. That
statute was drafted long after both the enactment of the ICTR Statute (eleven years) and
the judgment in the Tadic case (seven years). Assuming that the drafters of the IHT
Statute knew about the controversy over the issue of discriminatory intent, the wording of
Article 12 indicates that the drafters did not intend for discrimination to be a necessary
component for a crime against humanity. Even a cursory reading of the four major
tribunal statutes (ICTY, ICTR, the Rome Statute, and the IHT), will reveal that the first
three of those statutes heavily influenced the wording of the IHT one. The drafters of the
IHT Statute surely knew of the Secretary-General’s interpretation of Article 5 in the
ICTY Statute. The same drafters also must have known about the rule from Tadic and
about the distinction between the ICTR Statute and the ICTY one on this issue. In other
words, the drafters of the IHT Statute knew that the ICTR Statute required discrimination
for the second element and that the ICTY Statute did not require it. The IHT Statute
drafters therefore had to make a choice, and they chose to omit the requirement from
Article 12 and use the words “any civilian population” instead. Under this argument, that
choice must have been deliberate. If so, discrimination need not be present for the
second element of Article 12 to be satisfied.
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The “Elements of Crimes” manual issued for the Iraqi High Tribunal seems to
support this line of reasoning. The manual provides three detailed paragraphs explaining
the meaning of the “civilian population” element. Nowhere in that exegesis will one find
a requirement of discriminatory intent.70
The informants will counter-argue that the drafters’ awareness of the controversy
proves that discrimination must be established. Under this argument, the fact that the
drafters knew about Tadic and about the different statutory interpretations would
logically lead them to specify that discrimination need not be present as a motive. Given
the reasonableness of this counter-argument, the preferable course for the Prosecution
would be to demonstrate that the al Dujayl attack did arise from discriminatory grounds.
If the Prosecution determines that it lacks the evidence to support that claim, only then
should it resort to the “framers’ intent” argument.
b. No armed conflict necessary
An attack on a civilian population need not arise from armed conflict in order to
be a crime against humanity. The “Elements of Crimes” manual for the Iraqi High
Tribunal states this rule clearly: “`Attack directed against a civilian population’ is
understood to mean a course of conduct involving the commission of multiple acts…The
acts need not constitute a military attack.”71
Some of the evidence submitted by the Prosecution indicates that part of
Saddam’s campaign against al-Dujayl does amount to an armed, military attack.72 Yet, in
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the event that the Prosecution does not acquire enough evidence to establish an “armed
conflict” in al Dujayl, that evidence will not be necessary to demonstrate that a crime
against humanity occurred. The armed conflict requirement for crimes against humanity
first lost favor in the period immediately following the Nuremberg trials. Control
Council Law No. 10 made plain that an attack on a civilian population need not take the
form of an armed conflict to rise to the level of such a crime.73 Since that Control
Council rule went into effect, the separation between the armed conflict element and
crimes against humanity has become settled international law.
c. Part of a state policy
The campaign against al Dujayl stemmed from an official state policy against that
town’s civilians. Article 12 of the IHT Statute defines an “attack directed against any
civilian population” as one that occurs “pursuant to…a state…policy to commit such
attack.”74 Although this requirement does not appear in the text of the ICTR Statute, the
Rwanda Tribunal itself has applied that state policy requirement in its analysis of crimes
against humanity. As noted earlier, the Akayesu court held that the state policy need not
“be adopted formally as the policy of the state. There must however be some
preconceived plan or policy” (emphasis added).75 This application of the rule suggests
that the existence of a mere preconceived plan will satisfy the “state policy” requirement.
Since the documentary evidence submitted previously by the Prosecution establishes the
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existence of that plan, the al Dujayl campaign qualifies an attack conducted “pursuant to
a state policy.”76
Just like the ICTR Statute, the ICTY one contains no textual requirement of a
state policy for a charge of crimes against humanity. Just like the ICTR, though, the
ICTY has nonetheless developed the requirement through its case law. In language
similar to the Akayesu opinion, the Tadic court held that the state policy “need not be
formalized and can be deduced from the way in which the acts occur. Notably, if the acts
occur on a widespread or systematic basis, that demonstrates a policy to commit those
acts, whether formalized or not.”77 As discussed earlier in this memo, the documentary
evidence submitted on February 28th and March 1st reveals the systematic quality of the al
Dujayl attacks.78 Under Tadic, establishing that systematic nature establishes a state
policy as well.
The Tadic opinion goes on to specify the kinds of acts that would satisfy this test.
Quoting another ICTY case, the Tadic court ruled that, although the attacks “`need not be
related to a policy established at State level, in the conventional sense of the term, they
cannot be the work of isolated individuals alone.’”79 The attackers of al Dujayl obviously
did not act alone, and no official state policy need be shown under Tadic, even though the
evidence of February 18th and March 1st indicates such a policy. The work of Saddam’s
regime in al Dujayl therefore adequately meets the “state policy” requirement of an
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“attack on any civilian population” in Article 12. The assaults on the lives and livelihood
of the people of al Dujayl therefore satisfy the second element for crimes against
humanity.
3. With Knowledge of the Attack
This element simply sets knowledge as the requisite mens rea for a perpetrator of
a crime against humanity. While not all of the attackers among Saddam’s forces at al
Dujayl necessarily knew that they were engaged in a systematic plan to attack innocent
civilians, the Prosecution does not need to prove that extent of knowledge. The Elements
of Crimes manual for the IHT states that this knowledge requirement “should not be
interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all the characteristics
of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State….”80
The Prosecution therefore should face no difficulty in establishing this third and
last element of a crime against humanity. The second element (attack on any civilian
population) raises more doubt as to the best strategy, for it may require a discriminatory
intent that may be lacking in this case. Yet, given the two avenues through which this
problem can be solved, even this uncertainty should not preclude a judicial finding that
the evidence satisfies the second element. The lack of an armed conflict requirement and
the ease with which the Prosecution will demonstrate the state policy behind the attacks
will both make that result highly likely. The first element (the existence of a systematic
plan) and the third (the knowledge of the attackers) will be established even more easily.
With all three elements satisfied, the Prosecution will have established that a crime
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against humanity did indeed occur in al Dujayl, regardless of the result of Saddam’s
current trial.
C. The informants are liable as aiders and abettors of a crime against
humanity.
The residents of al Dujayl who informed on the victims have brought liability
onto themselves through that act. In helping Saddam’s agents identify and locate the
residents who would soon become detainees, torture victims, and casualties, the
informants served as aiders and abettors to one of the most serious of international crimes:
the crime against humanity. Under Article 15 of the IHT Statute, a person who “aids,
abets, or otherwise assists in the commission” of a crime against humanity subjects
herself to criminal liability, even if she only “provid[es] the means” for the principal
crime.81 That language describes well the activities of the informants. They assisted in
the commission of the regime’s acts by providing the means for them to occur. The “or”
in the phrase quoted above indicates that the informants can be held liable as accomplices
simply for assisting the principal perpetrators of the al Dujayl attacks. Therefore, even if
the Prosecution could not establish that the informants are aiders and abettors, their
assistance to the regime alone would trigger their liability as accomplices.
Yet, the Prosecution will not have hang its case on that theory, for the
aiding/abetting charge can be proven as well. The same “or” that makes the informants
liable for merely assisting in the crime also makes them liable for either aiding or
abetting it. The distinction between aiding and abetting could prove meaningful in the al
Dujayl case. In Akayesu, the ICTR defined “abetting” as “facilitating the commission of
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an act by being sympathetic thereto.”82 The court defined “aiding”, on the other hand, as
simply “giving assistance to someone.”83 Since the al Dujayl informants will likely assert
that they bore no wish for the victims to be harmed, the Prosecution may encounter some
difficulty in proving the abetting charge, as Akayesu defined it. Yet, no such difficulty
will arise in establishing that the informants aided the attackers. The work of the “aider”
does not even have to be vital to the criminal enterprise for him to incur liability. The
ICTY held that the “assistance need not constitute an indispensable element, that is, a
conditio sine qua non for the acts of the principal.”84 Given this low threshold for
proving that a person aided in a crime of international law, the al Dujayl informants
certainly “aided” in Saddam’s crime against humanity.
1. Informing constitutes an act of aiding and abetting.
Even if the “aiding” charge could not be proven so readily, several precedents
establish that an informant specifically qualifies as an aider and abettor. In a German
domestic case dealing with Nazi collaborators, a civilian employer had supposedly
criticized Hitler in the presence of his employees.85 Two of the civilian employees
informed on him to the Nazi authorities, who ultimately sent the employer to a
concentration camp to die. After the war, the two employees stood trial for the murder of
their former boss. The trial court held them not guilty, partly due to the attenuated
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connection between the act of informing and the killing at the concentration camp.86 The
appeals court reversed and remanded the case, though, finding that the informing
intimately related to the death.87
Similarly, a French military tribunal convicted a civilian informer for the Nazis in
that country.88 The informer had reported the resistance activities of a number of fellow
civilians to the Nazi regime, and those members of the resistance (like the al Dujayl
victims) were then subjected to arrest, torture, and deportation.89 The informer-defendant
argued at trial that he should not be held responsible for the deaths and deportations, as
they happened outside of his control and far away from him geographically. The tribunal
rejected this argument and held that “the connection between the act contributing to the
commission and the act of commission itself can be geographically and temporally
distanced.”90
These two cases do not specifically address the international law charge of
“crimes against humanity.” The cases were decided by the domestic courts of two
European countries, and the French Tribunal did not address the specific charge of crimes
against humanity. Yet, the German court did find the two informers in that case guilty of
a crime against humanity. Also, the facts of the cases resemble the facts of the al Dujayl
informants enough to make the two courts’ analyses illustrative of the legal connection
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between informing and criminal liability. Both the German informant-defendants were
civilians who did not participate in the principal crime, and the principal crime in both
cases happened in a setting removed from the informants themselves. Yet, those facts did
not save those defendants from criminal liability for the principal crime. Likewise, the
IHT will not likely let the al Dujayl informants shield themselves from liability with that
argument. Additionally, these two cases will carry some persuasive authority in the IHT
because the ICTR endorsed both holdings in Akayesu and applied both the holdings to its
analysis of crimes against humanity in that case.91 The IHT will therefore likely be
persuaded that informing constitutes an act of aiding or abetting and therefore triggers
liability under Article 15.
2. A low mens rea requirement
The Prosecution will succeed in proving the informants’ liability for a variety of
reasons, but one of those reasons is the minimal mens rea requirement called for by the
IHT Statute and by precedent. As noted earlier,92 the mens rea element for a crime
against humanity, under Article 12, is mere knowledge, not intent.93 Also as noted earlier,
the perpetrator himself need not know all the details of the attack plan in order to be
guilty of the crime. If even the principal need not possess extensive knowledge, then the
mens rea requirement for the aiders will amount to a low evidentiary threshold.
The IHT Statute does not specify a separate mens rea for aiders in Article 15. Yet,
other tribunals have set a lower mens rea standard for aiders/abettors than for principals.
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In Akayesu, the ICTR ruled that “if the accused knowingly aided and abetted in the
commission of…a murder while he knew or had reason to know that the principal was
acting with genocidal intent, the accused would be an accomplice to genocide, even
though he did not share the murderer’s intent to destroy the group.”94 In similar language,
the ICTY held Dusko Tadic guilty of crimes against humanity in part because he “knew
or had reason to know that, by his acts or omission, he was participating in the attack on
the population.”95
The Prosecution should encounter little difficulty in establishing that the al Dujayl
informers had reason to know that their act of informing would contribute to the illegal
imprisonment and murder of innocent fellow civilians. The documents and video already
entered into evidence show that Saddam’s forces rampaged through the town and
conducted their investigation with indiscriminate violence.96 The IHT will need to hear
little more evidence to conclude that the informers knew or should have known that a
crime against humanity would befall the neighbors on whom they informed. In fact, the
Tadic court also held that such knowledge “can be inferred from the circumstances.”97
The house-to-house intrusions and beatings occurring in al Dujayl on the day of the
informing constitute all the circumstances necessary for the IHT to infer the informers’
knowledge. Given that loose standard for establishing the mens rea element, the
Prosecution will almost undoubtedly succeed in proving that the informers acted as aiders
in the al Dujayl crime against humanity.
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D. The informant-defendants are not liable for genocide, war crimes, or
violations of Iraqi law.
1. Genocide
The IHT will not likely assign liability to the informants for genocide. Although
Article 11 of the IHT Statute lists various acts that constitute genocide, all of them
require that the perpetrator “intended to destroy, in whole or in part,” a particular national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group.98 As discussed earlier,99 the Prosecution would find
great difficulty in establishing that discriminatory intent even for the principals in the
campaign against al Dujayl. To ascribe that same intent to the informant aiders would
pose a nearly impossible challenge.
The ICTR provided precedent for this view in Akayesu, holding that “when
dealing with a person Accused of having aided and abetted in…genocide, it must be
proven that such a person did have the specific intent to commit genocide.”100 The court
in that case went on to explain that this “specific intent” requirement does not arise in a
charge of crimes against humanity.101 Therefore, even though the Genocide Convention
allows for prosecution of civilians for genocide,102 the IHT Prosecutor should not pursue
this charge against the al Dujayl informants.
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2. War Crimes
The charge of “War Crimes” requires an armed conflict missing from the al
Dujayl case. The Elements of Crimes manual for the IHT begins with the clear rule that
“elements for war crimes under Article 13 shall be interpreted within the established
framework of the international law of armed conflict….”103 Although residents of al
Dujayl apparently fired upon Saddam’s entourage during his July 8th visit, that isolated
event would hardly satisfy the “armed conflict” element under the IHT’s rules.
3. Violations of Iraqi Laws
The Prosecution will not be able to win a conviction for this Article 14 category
of crimes because the informants actually followed Iraqi law (although they were under
no compulsion to do so). The Iraqi Penal Code in existence at the time of the al Dujayl
campaign prescribed detention or a fine for any official who fails to notify his superiors
as to events important to the regime.104 By notifying Saddam’s regime of the presence of
Dawa Party families in al Dujayl, the informants acted according to the spirit and
wording of the Penal Code’s Paragraph 247. An Article 14 charge that the informants
violated Iraqi law will therefore not succeed.
4. Joint Criminal Enterprise
Given the futility of pursuing a conviction for genocide, war crimes, or violations
of Iraqi laws, the Prosecution should focus solely on the charge of crimes against
humanity, and only through the vehicle of aider/abettor theory. The joint criminal
enterprise theory will not withstand scrutiny by the IHT. The same intent element that
103
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makes the genocide charge impossible also precludes the joint criminal enterprise
approach. The ICTY addressed this issue in Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, assigning the mens
rea of intent to a joint criminal enterprise while applying a mere knowledge mens rea to
aiding and abetting. In light of this law, the IHT Prosecutor should limit the informants’
case to the aider and abettor theory, and only for crimes against humanity.
IV. DEFENSES
A. Following Orders
The informant-defendants may invoke the defense of following orders.
Unfortunately for the informants, though, only soldiers may employ that defense.105 As
the scholar Elies van Sliedregt has pointed out, the “reason for being more lenient
towards a soldier than an ordinary citizen, in allowing the defence of superior orders, lies
in the special relationship between a subordinate and a superior.”106 The factors
contributing to that rule are the central role of following orders in a soldier’s training and
the safety concerns raised when a soldier disobeys an order.107 The al Dujayl informants
therefore cannot avail themselves of this defense.
The informant-defendants may nonetheless insist that their acts were lawful
because of the Iraqi Penal Code’s requirement that officials report information important
to the government.108 Yet, the defense of following the law, like the defense of superior
orders, only applies to soldiers, and only when such a soldier follows a law pursuant to a
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direct command from a superior officer.109 Thus, even if the “soldiers only” rule did not
apply to the al Dujayl informants, this defense still would not help their case, for no
superior officer in the Baath Party ordered them to write the letters identifying the
“disloyal” villagers. According to the media reports, the defendants wrote these letters
on their own initiative.110 Any defense related to superior orders or the Iraqi Penal Code
will therefore fall flat.
B. The “small cog in the wheel” defense
One of the informant defendants has already argued, as a defense, that he played
too small a role in the al Dujayl campaign to be liable before the IHT.111 This defense
has failed too often to be taken seriously. Two prominent cases illustrate the point.
Adolph Eichmann’s use of it met with sharp rebuke at his trial, where the court held that
parties who play even a small role in crimes against humanity must be held accountable
for them.112 By implication, the German Appeals Court’s Case No.16 also sets a
persuasive precedent for forbidding such a defense. The defendants in that case did not
even possess the minor government positions held by the al Dujayl informants.113 The
Case No. 16 defendants were merely regular civilians employed by the victim of their
crime against humanity.114 Yet, that low-level status did not prevent the court in that case
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from holding those defendants liable.115 The al Dujayl defendants therefore will not get
far with their “small cog in the wheel” defense.
V. CONCLUSION
The IHT will likely assign criminal liability to the al Dujayl informants for crimes
against humanity. Those defendants acted as aiders and abettors to Saddam’s forces
during the attack on the town. The Prosecution will be able to establish that a crime
against humanity occurred because the evidence already submitted satisfies the three
elements of that crime in the IHT’s Article 12.
Once that crime is established, demonstrating that the informants aided that crime
will prove to be an even easier affair. Precedent shows that informing amounts to aiding
a crime, even for crimes against humanity. Also, the mens rea element for aiding that
crime requires relatively little evidence. Given that the informers will not succeed in
their probable defenses, the IHT will likely assign liability to those civilians.
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